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Abstract
In this paper, we characterise the compromise value of a game as the
barycentre of the edges of its core cover. For this, we introduce the ¿¤ value,
which extends the adjusted proportional rule for bankruptcy situations and
coincides with the compromise value on a large class of games.
1 Introduction
Most game-theoretic solution concepts that have been proposed in the literature are
deﬁned on the basis of or characterised by properties. These properties are usually
formulated in terms of individual payoﬀs and reﬂect notions like monotonicity and
rationality. For some values, there exist additional characterisations in terms of
geometry. The best-known example is the Shapley value (Shapley (1953)), which
is the barycentre of the extreme points of the Weber set (taking multiplicities into
account).
For some classes of games, there exist nice geometric expressions for the compro-
mise or ¿ value (Tijs (1981)). In particular, the compromise value is the barycentre of
the core cover in big boss games (Muto et al. (1988)) and 1-convex games (Driessen
(1988)).
In this paper, we extend the APROP rule for bankruptcy situations (Curiel
et al. (1987)) to the whole class of compromise admissible (or quasi-balanced)
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1games (cf. Tijs (1981)). This extended rule, which we call ¿¤, turns out to be the
barycentre of the edges of the core cover (taking multiplicities into account), which
is our main result. Since this rule coincides with the compromise value if, after
normalising such that each player’s minimal right equals zero, each player’s utopia
payoﬀ is at most the value of the grand coalition, our main result immediately
provides a characterisation of the compromise value on this class of games.
This paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we extend the APROP rule and
deﬁne the barycentre ³ of the edges of the core cover. In section 3, we state our main
result and give an overview of the proof, which consists of six main steps. Finally,
in section 4, we prove our main result.
2 The ¿¤ value
A transferable utility or TU game is a pair (N;v), where N = f1;:::;ng is a set of
players and v : 2N ! R is a function assigning to every coalition S ½ N a payoﬀ
v(S). By convention, v(;) = 0.
Following Tijs and Lipperts (1982), the utopia vector of a game (N;v), M(v) 2
RN, is deﬁned by
Mi(v) = v(N) ¡ v(Nnfig)







for all i 2 N.
The core cover of a game (N;v) consists of those allocations of v(N) according
to which every player receives at most his utopia payoﬀ and at least his minimal
right:




xi = v(N); m(v) · x · M(v)g:
A game is called compromise admissible if it has a nonempty core cover. We denote
the class of compromise admissible games with player set N by CAN. A rule on a
subclass A ½ CAN is a function f : A ! RN assigning to each v 2 A a payoﬀ vector
f(v) 2 RN such that
P
i2N fi(v) = v(N).
The compromise or ¿ value (Tijs (1981)) is the rule on CAN deﬁned as the point
on the line segment between m(v) and M(v) that is eﬃcient with respect to v(N):
2¿(v) = ¸m(v) + (1 ¡ ¸)M(v);
where ¸ 2 [0;1] is such that
P
i2N ¿i = v(N).
A bankruptcy situation is a triple (N;E;c), where E ¸ 0 is the estate to be
divided and c 2 RN
+ with
P
i2N ci ¸ E is the vector of claims. The corresponding
bankruptcy game (N;vE;c) is deﬁned by vE;c(S) = maxfE ¡
P
i2NnS ci;0g for all
S ½ N. We denote the class of bankruptcy situations with player set N by BRN.
The class of corresponding games is a proper subclass of CAN. A bankruptcy rule is
a function f : BRN ! RN assigning to every bankruptcy situation (N;E;c) 2 BRN
a payoﬀ vector f(E;c) 2 RN
+ such that
P
i2N fi(E;c) = E.
In the literature, many bankruptcy rules have been proposed. One interesting
question is how these can be extended in a natural way to the whole class of com-
promise admissible games. In this paper, we consider the proportional rule and the
adjusted proportional rule (cf. Curiel et al. (1987)). The proportional rule PROP





for all (N;E;c) 2 BRN and i 2 N. The adjusted proportional rule APROP ﬁrst
gives each player i 2 N his minimal right mi(E;c) = maxfE ¡
P
j2Nnfig cj;0g and
the remainder is divided using the proportional rule, where each player’s claim is
truncated to the estate left:
APROP(E;c) = m(E;c) + PROP(E
0;c
0);
where E0 = E ¡
P
i2N mi(E;c) and for all i 2 N, c0
i = minfci ¡ mi(E;c);E0g.
The compromise value can be seen as an extension of the PROP rule:




Note that it follows from the deﬁnition of compromise admissibility that the argu-
ment of PROP is indeed a bankruptcy situation.
Similarly, we can extend the APROP rule:
¿




To simplify the expression for ¿¤, we show that the minimum rights in the associated
bankruptcy situation equal 0. Let v 2 CAN, E = v(N) ¡
P
i2N mi(v), c = M(v) ¡
















since mi(v) ¸ v(N)¡
P
j2Nnfig Mj(v). Hence, mi(E;c) = maxfE¡
P
j2Nnfig cj;0g =
0. As a result, we have
¿
¤(v) = m(v) + PROP(E
0;c
0) (2.1)
with E0 = v(N) ¡
P
i2N mi(v) and c0
i = minfMi(v) ¡ mi(v);E0g for all i 2 N.
It follows that for a game v 2 CAN with Mi(v) ¡ mi(v) · v(N) ¡
P
j2N mj(v)
for all i 2 N, ¿¤ coincides with the compromise value ¿.
The extended rule ¿¤ turns out to be a kind of barycentre of the core cover, which
is the main result of our paper. To deﬁne this barycentre rule ³, we need to introduce
some more concepts. A permutation on N is a bijection ¾ : f1;:::;ng ! N, where
¾(p) denotes the player at position p, and consequently, ¾¡1(i) denotes the position
of player i. The set of all permutations on N is denoted by Π(N). ¾i;j denotes the
permutation obtained from ¾ by switching players i and j. Two permutations ¾ and
¾¾(p);¾(p+1) are called permutation neighbours. The set of permutation neighbours of
¾ is denoted by Π¾(N).
The core cover is a polytope whose extreme points are called larginal vectors or
larginals. The larginal `¾ 2 RN corresponding to order ¾ 2 Π(N) (cf. Quant et al.






















for all p 2 f1;:::;ng.
Note that two permutations that are neighbours yield larginals which are adjacent
extreme points of the core cover (possibly coinciding), which we also call permutation
neighbours.
We deﬁne the ³ rule as a weighted average of the larginal vectors:1
1In the degenerate case where M = m, the core cover consists of a single point, which we deﬁne


















equals the sum of the Euclidean distances between `¾(v) and all its permutation
neighbours, divided by the common factor
p
2. The ³ value can be viewed as the
barycentre of the edges of the core cover, taking the multiplicities into account.
To simplify the proofs later on, we ﬁrst show that both ¿¤ and ³ satisfy the prop-
erties (SEQ) and (RTRUNC). Two games v and ˆ v are called strategically equivalent
if there exists a real number k > 0 and a vector a 2 RN such that for all S ½ N,
ˆ v(S) = kv(S) + a(S); (2.3)
with a(S) =
P
i2S ai. A function f : CAN ! RN is relatively invariant wrt strategic
equivalence (SEQ) if for all v; ˆ v 2 CAN such that (2.3) holds for some k > 0;a 2 RN,
we have
f(ˆ v) = kf(v) + a:
It is well-known that the utopia vector M and the minimum right vector m both
satisfy (SEQ).
Proposition 2.1 The ¿¤ rule and the ³ rule satisfy (SEQ).
Proof: The proof for ¿¤ is straightforward and therefore omitted.
It readily follows from (SEQ) of m and M that `¾ also satisﬁes (SEQ) for all ¾ 2













































= k³(v) + a:
And so, ³ satisﬁes (SEQ). ¤
A rule f : CAN ! RN satisﬁes the restricted truncation property (RTRUNC) if for
all v 2 CAN with m(v) = 0 it holds that for all ˆ v 2 CAN with ˆ v(N) = v(N),
m(ˆ v) = 0 and Mi(ˆ v) = minfMi(v);v(N)g we have f(ˆ v) = f(v). The idea behind
(RTRUNC) is that if a player’s utopia value (or, in bankruptcy terms, his claim) is
higher than the value of the grand coalition (the estate), his payoﬀ according to f
should not by inﬂuenced by truncating this claim.
Proposition 2.2 The ¿¤ rule and the ³ rule satisfy (RTRUNC).
Proof: Let v 2 CAN with m(v) = 0. Then (2.1) reduces to
¿
¤(v) = PROP(v(N);(minfMi(v);v(N)g)i2N):
From this it immediately follows that ¿¤ satisﬁes (RTRUNC).
For the ³ rule, it suﬃces to note that truncating the utopia vector has no inﬂuence
on the larginal vectors. ¤
3 Main result
In this section, we present our main result: equality between ¿¤ and ³ on CAN.
After dealing with some simple cases, we present a six step outline of the proof,
which we will give in the next section.
Theorem 3.1 Let v 2 CAN. Then
¿
¤(v) = ³(v):
6As a result of Proposition 2.1, it suﬃces to show equality for every game v 2 CAN
with m(v) = 0. Next, we can use Proposition 2.2 and conclude that we have to show







In case there are only two players, equality between ¿¤ and ³ follows from M1(v) =
M2(v) = v(N).
If Mi(v) = 0 for a player i 2 N, then we have ¿¤
i (v) = ³i(v) = 0. Fur-
thermore, for each ¾ 2 Π(N), the payoﬀ to the players in Nnfig according
to `¾(v) equals their payoﬀ in the situation without player i4 according to the





Nnfig(j) , ¾¡1(h) < ¾¡1(j) for all h;j 2 Nnfig. It is readily veri-
ﬁed that also the total weight of each larginal (taking multiplicities into account) is
the same in the game with and without player i. Hence, we can omit player i from
the game and establish equality between ¿¤ and ³ for the remaining players.5
We establish equality between ¿¤ and ³ by combining the permutations in the
numerator and denominator in (2.2) into so-called chains. In the denominator,
these chains allow us to combine terms in such a way that the total weight can be
expressed as a simple function of M(v). In the numerator, we construct an iterative
procedure to ﬁnd an expression for the weighted larginals, in which the chains allow
us to keep track of changes that occur from one iteration to the next.
The proof of Theorem 3.1 consists of six steps:
1. We ﬁrst ﬁnd an expression for the weight of each permutation. This is done
by introducing the concept of pivot and classifying each permutation in terms
of its pivot and its neighbours’ pivots.
2. Using the concept of pivot, we introduce chains, which constitute a partition
2Note that the condition Mi(v) · v(N) is necessary and suﬃcient to have Mi(v) =
max¾2Π(N) `¾
i (v). Only in this case, the utopia vector can be reconstructed from the core cover.
3The denominator is zero if and only if M(v) = 0(= m(v)). In this degenerate case equality
between ¿¤ and ³ is trivial and we therefore assume M(v) 	 0.
4Ie, the situation with player set Nnfig, utopia vector MNnfig(v) and the same amount v(N)
to be distributed.
5Geometrically, the core cover, which lies in the hyperplane Mi(v) = 0, is projected onto a
space which is one dimension lower.
7of the set of all permutations. The results of the previous step are then used
to compute the total weight of each chain.
3. We deﬁne a family of auxiliary functions fij and gij, which are used to show
that each player “belongs” to the same number of chains. As a result, we use
our expression of the previous step to compute the total of all the weights, ie,
the denominator in (2.2).
4. In the numerator, we partition the set of chains on the basis of the ﬁrst player
in each permutation. Within each part, we compute the total weighted payoﬀ
to all the players. For the ﬁrst player, this total weighted payoﬀ can easily be
computed.
5. The expression for the payoﬀs to the other players is proved using an iterative
argument, varying the utopia vector while keeping v(N) constant. We start
with a utopia vector for which our expression is trivial and lower this vector
step by step until we reach M(v). In each step of the iteration, (generically)
only two chains change and using this, we show that the total weighted payoﬀ
to each player who is not ﬁrst does not change as function of the utopia vector.
6. Combining the previous three steps, we derive an expression for ³ and show
that this equals ¿¤.
4 Proof of main result
Throughout this section, let v 2 CAN be such that jNj ¸ 3, m(v) = 0, M(v) > 0,








Since v is ﬁxed for the rest of the section, we will suppress it as argument and write
M rather than M(v), etc. The weight w¾(v) will be denoted by w(¾).
Step 1: pivots
Let ¾ 2 Π(N). Player ¾(p) with p ¸ 2 is called the pivot in `¾ if `¾
¾(p¡1) = M¾(p¡1),
`¾
¾(p) > 0 and `¾
¾(p+1) = 0. The pivot of a larginal is the player who gets a lower
8amount according this larginal if the amount v(N) is decreased slightly. In the
boundary case where M¾(1) = v(N), v(N) cannot be decreased without violating
the condition M¾(1) · v(N); in this case, player ¾(2) is deﬁned to be the pivot,
being the player who gets a higher amount if v(N) is increased slightly. Note that
m = 0 implies that
P
j2Nnfig Mj ¸ v(N) and hence, player ¾(n) can never be the
pivot.
In the following example, we introduce a game which we will use throughout the
paper to illustrate the various concepts.
Example 4.1 Consider the game (N;v) with N = f1;:::;5g, v(N) = 10 and
M = (5;7;1;3;4). For this game, we have ¿¤ = ³ = 1




and player 2 is the pivot. /
For a permutation ¾ 2 Π(N), we deﬁne p¾ to be the position at which the pivot6
is located. We deﬁne ¾L = ¾¾(p¾¡1);¾(p¾) to be the left neighbour of ¾ and ¾R =
¾¾(p¾);¾(p¾+1) to be the right neighbour of ¾. It follows from the deﬁnition of pivot
that the left and right neighbours of `¾ are the only two permutation neighbours
that can give rise to a larginal diﬀerent from `¾.
Recall that the weight of `¾, w(¾), equals the sum of the (Euclidean) distances
between `¾ and all its permutation neighbours. In line with the previous paragraph,















We classify the larginals into four categories, depending on the pivot in the left and
right neighbours. Let ¾ = (:::;h;i;j;:::) be a permutation with pivot i. Then the
four types are given in the following table:
Type Pivot in ¾L Pivot in ¾ Pivot in ¾R
PPP i i i
¡PP h i i
PP¡ i i j
¡P¡ h i j
6As with neighbours, we use the term pivot as property of a permutation as well as the corre-
sponding larginal.
9We can now determine the weight of each larginal, depending on its type. Take
¾ 2 Π(N) to be the identity permutation and assume that `¾ is of type PP¡ and
has pivot i. Then
`













































Doing these calculations for all types and arbitrary ¾ 2 Π(N), we obtain the follow-
ing weights:
Type w(¾)
PPP M¾(p¾¡1) + M¾(p¾+1)
¡PP
Pp¾+1





Example 4.2 With ¾1 the identity permutation, we have (the player with ˆ is the
pivot):
¾1 = (1;ˆ 2;3;4;5) `¾1 = (5;5;0;0;0)
¾L
1 = (2;ˆ 1;3;4;5) `¾L
1 = (3;7;0;0;0)
¾R
1 = (1;3;ˆ 2;4;5) `¾R
1 = (5;4;1;0;0)












= 2 + 1
= 3:
10Indeed, we have that w(¾1) =
Pp¾1+1
k=1 M¾1(k) ¡ v(N) = M1 + M2 + M3 ¡ v(N) =
5 + 7 + 1 ¡ 10 = 3, as the table shows. /
Step 2: chains
A chain of length q and with pivot i is a set of q permutations Γ = f¾1;:::;¾qg such
that
² (¾m)R = ¾m+1 for all m 2 f1;:::;q ¡ 1g,
² i is pivot in ¾m for all m 2 f1;:::;qg,
² i is not pivot in ¾L
1 and ¾R
q .
If q = 1, then it follows from the deﬁnitions of the four types that ¾1 is of type ¡P¡.
If q > 1, then ¾1 is of type ¡PP, ¾m is of type PPP for all m 2 f2;:::;q ¡ 1g,
and ¾q is of type PP¡. Observe that the set of all chains, which we denote by C,
constitutes a partition of the set of permutations Π(N).
Denoting by ¾¤ the permutation on the n¡1 players obtained from ¾ by removing
the pivot, we characterise the chains in the following lemma.




Given the weights of the larginal vectors, depending on the type, we can easily
compute the weight of a chain Γ, which is simply deﬁned as the total weight of its
elements, ie, w(Γ) =
P
¾2Γ w(¾).









k=1 M¾1(k) ¡ v(N) + M¾1(p) + M¾1(p+1)
w(¾2) = + M¾1(p+1) + M¾1(p+2)
w(¾3) = + M¾1(p+2) + M¾1(p+3)
. . . =
. . .
. . .
w(¾q¡1) = + M¾1(p+q¡2) + M¾1(p+q¡1)
w(¾q) = ¡
Pp¡1







We say that player i 2 N belongs to chain Γ = f¾1;:::;¾qg if i 2
f¾1(p¾1);:::;¾1(p¾1 + q ¡ 1)g, ie, if his position is not constant throughout the
chain. Note that if a player does belong to a chain, his utopia payoﬀ contributes to
its weight. We deﬁne C(i) to be the set of chains to which i belongs. By P(i) ½ C(i)
we denote the set of chains in which i is pivot and by ¯ P(i) = C(i)nP(i) its comple-
ment. For each Λ 2 ¯ P(i), we denote the permutation in Λ in which i is immediately
before the pivot by ¸bi and the permutation in which i is immediately after the pivot
by ¸ai.
Example 4.3 Since player 2 is not the pivot in ¾L
1 , ¾1 is the ﬁrst permutation of
a chain. This chain Γ consists of ¾1, ¾2 = ¾R
1 and ¾3 = ¾R
2 , all having player 2 as
pivot. In line of Lemma 4.1, we have ¾¤
1 = ¾¤
2 = ¾¤
3 = (1;3;4;5). Players 2, 3 and 4
belong to Γ and w(Γ) = M2 + M3 + M4 = 11. /
Step 3: denominator
In this step, we derive an expression for the denominator in ³. We do this by showing
that each player belongs to the same number of chains, ie,
jC(i)j = jC(j)j (4.1)
for all i;j 2 N. If Mi = Mj, then this is trivial, so throughout this step, let i;j 2 N
be such that Mi > Mj. We prove only one part of (4.1):
jP(j)j + j ¯ P(j)j · jP(i)j + j ¯ P(i)j: (4.2)
The proof of the reverse inequality goes along similar lines, as will be indicated later
on.
12An immediate consequence of Lemma 4.4 is that it follows from Mi > Mj that
jP(i)j ¸ jP(j)j and j ¯ P(j)j ¸ j ¯ P(i)j. We establish (4.2) in Proposition 4.5 by part-
nering all the chains in P(j) to some of the chains in P(i) and partnering all the
chains ¯ P(i) to some of the chains in ¯ P(j). We then show that for every chain in
¯ P(j) which has no partner in ¯ P(i), we can ﬁnd a chain in P(i) which has no partner
in P(j).




∆ 7! f(∆) = Λ
where ∆ = f±1;:::;±qg and Λ is the chain to which ±
i;j
1 belongs. Note that the








Λ 7! g(Λ) = ∆
where for all Λ 2 ¯ P(i), ∆ is the chain containing ¸
i;j
bi .7
In the following lemma, we show that gij is well-deﬁned, ie, that the chain ∆
thus constructed is indeed an element of the range of gij, ¯ P(j).
Lemma 4.3 The function gij is well-deﬁned.
Proof: Denote the pivot player in ¸bi (and hence, ¸ai) by h. Observe that as
a result of Mi > Mj, player h cannot coincide with j. Distinguish between the
following two cases:
² i is before j in ¸bi:
¸ai = (:::;ˆ h;i;:::;j;:::) ¸
i;j
ai = (:::;ˆ h;j;:::;i;:::)
¸bi = (:::;i;ˆ h;:::;j;:::) ¸
i;j
bi = (:::;j;ˆ h;:::;i;:::)
7By ¸
i;j
bi we mean (¸bi)i;j, ie, the permutation which is obtained by switching i and j in the
permutation in Λ where i is immediately before the pivot.
13Since h is pivot in ¸ai, it immediately follows that h is also pivot in ¸
i;j
ai. Player
j cannot be the pivot in ¸
i;j
bi , because i is before the pivot in ¸bi and Mi > Mj.
Combining this with the fact that h is pivot in ¸
i;j





ai belongs to the same chain ∆ as ¸
i;j
bi . From this, ∆ 2 C(j), and
because j is not the pivot in ∆, ∆ 2 ¯ P(j).
² j is before i in ¸bi:
¸ai = (:::;j;:::;ˆ h;i;:::) ¸
i;j
ai = (:::;i;:::;ˆ h;j;:::)
¸bi = (:::;j;:::;i;ˆ h;:::) ¸
i;j
bi = (:::;i;:::;j;ˆ h;:::)
Since h is pivot in ¸bi, we immediately have that h is pivot in ¸
i;j
bi . Because of
this, the pivot in ¸
i;j
ai cannot be before h. It can also not be after h, because
h is pivot in ¸ai and Mi > Mj. By the same argument as in the ﬁrst case,
∆ 2 ¯ P(j).
From these two cases, we conclude that gij is well-deﬁned. ¤
For our partnering argument to hold, we need that the functions fij and gij are
injective. This is shown in the following lemma.
Lemma 4.4 The functions fij and gij are injective.
Proof: To see that fij is injective, let ∆; ˜ ∆ 2 P(j) be such that fij(∆) = fij(˜ ∆).





1 . Since by assumption these permutations are in the same chain, by Lemma 4.1
we have (±
i;j
1 )¤ = (˜ ±
i;j
1 )¤. But since j is pivot in both ±1 and ˜ ±1, it follows that
±¤
1 = ˜ ±¤
1. So, ±1 and ˜ ±1 are in the same chain and ∆ = ˜ ∆.
For injectivity of gij, let Λ; ˜ Λ 2 ¯ P(i) be such that gij(Λ) = gij(˜ Λ). Then ¸
i;j
bi and ˜ ¸
i;j
bi
are in the same chain. By the same arguments as used before, j is just before the
pivot in both permutations and hence, ¸
i;j
bi = ˜ ¸
i;j
bi . From this, we conclude ¸bi = ˜ ¸bi
and Λ = ˜ Λ. ¤
From Lemma 4.4, we conclude
jP(j)j · jP(i)j
and
14j ¯ P(i)j · j ¯ P(j)j:
With these inequalities, we can now apply our partnering argument to prove that
each player belongs to the same number of chains.
Proposition 4.5 Let i;j 2 N. Then jC(i)j = jC(j)j.
Proof: If Mi = Mj, then the statement is trivial. Hence, assume without loss of
generality that Mi > Mj.
We only show (4.2). Let ∆ 2 ¯ P(j) be such that there exists no Λ 2 ¯ P(i) with
gij(Λ) = ∆. Denote the pivot in ∆ by h and distinguish between the following three
cases:
² h 6= i and i is after j in ±bj:
±aj = (:::;ˆ h;j;:::;i;:::) ±
i;j
aj = (:::;ˆ h;i;:::;j;:::)
±bj = (:::;j;ˆ h;:::;i;:::) ±
i;j
bj = (:::;ˆ i;h;:::;j;:::)
Of course, h is also the pivot in ±
i;j
aj. If h were the pivot in ±
i;j





bj would belong to the same chain Λ 2 ¯ P(i). But then gij(Λ) = ∆, which
is impossible by assumption. Since Mi > Mj, player i must be the pivot in
±
i;j
bj . The chain to which ±
i;j
bj belongs cannot be an image under fij, since it is
obtained by switching i and j in a permutation in which j is not the pivot.
Furthermore, two diﬀerent starting chains ∆; ˜ ∆ 2 ¯ P(j) cannot give rise to one
single chain containing ±
i;j
bj and ˜ ±
i;j
bj , because both permutations are of type
PP¡ or ¡P¡ and there can be only one such permutation in a chain.
² h 6= i and i is before j in ±bj:
±aj = (:::;i;:::;ˆ h;j;:::) ±
i;j
aj = (:::;j;:::;h;ˆ i;:::)
±bj = (:::;i;:::;j;ˆ h;:::) ±
i;j
bj = (:::;j;:::;i;ˆ h;:::)
Again, it easily follows that h is pivot in ±
i;j
bj and by the same argument as in the
ﬁrst case, i must be pivot in ±
i;j
aj. Also, the chain to which ±
i;j
aj belongs cannot
be an image under fij and two diﬀerent starting chains ∆; ˜ ∆ 2 ¯ P(j) cannot
give rise to one single chain containing ±
i;j
aj and ˜ ±
i;j
aj, because both permutations
15are of type ¡PP or ¡P¡. Moreover, the chains constructed in this second
case, containing ±
i;j
aj, must diﬀer from the chains constructed in the ﬁrst case,
containing ±
i;j
bj , as a result of the relative positions of h and j.
² h = i:
±aj = (:::;ˆ i;j;:::) ±
i;j
aj = (:::;j;ˆ i;:::)
±bj = (:::;j;ˆ i;:::) ±
i;j
bj = (:::;ˆ i;j;:::)




bj . So, these two permutations belong
to the same chain Λ 2 P(i). Again Λ cannot be an image under fij, and
since Λ = ∆, diﬀerent starting chains give rise to diﬀerent Λ’s. Finally, since
j belongs to the “new” chains constructed in this case, they must diﬀer from
the chains in the ﬁrst two cases.
Combining the three cases, for every element of ¯ P(j) that is not an image under
gij of any chain in ¯ P(i), we have found a diﬀerent element of P(i) that is not an
image under fij of any chain in P(j). Together with Lemma 4.4, jP(j)j + j ¯ P(j)j ·
jP(i)j + j ¯ P(i)j.
Similarly, by taking Λ 2 P(i) such that there exists no ∆ 2 P(j) with Λ = fij(∆),
one can prove the reverse inequality of (4.2). Combining the two inequalities, we
obtain jC(i)j = jC(j)j. ¤
Using the previous proposition, we can compute the total weight of all larginals.
Proposition 4.6
P
¾2Π(N) w(¾) = (n ¡ 1)!
P
i2N Mi.
Proof: Since each of the n players belongs to the same number of chains and there
are n! permutations making up the chains, each player belongs to n!
n = (n ¡ 1)!
chains. But then the statement immediately follows from Lemma 4.2. ¤
Step 4: numerator, ﬁrst player
Now we turn our attention to the numerator of ³. For this, we partition the set of
chains into subsets with the same starting player:
Ck = ff¾1;:::;¾qg 2 C j¾1(1) = kg:
16Note that since player k is by deﬁnition never the pivot in ¾1, he is also the ﬁrst
player in ¾2;:::;¾q. It is easily veriﬁed that fCkgk2N is indeed a partition of C.








We compute the numerator in (2.2) by combining the permutations that belong to
the same Ck, k 2 N. We derive an expression for
P
Γ2Ck LΓ
i for each player i 2 N.
In this step, we consider the special case where i = k, while in the next step we
compute the payoﬀ to the other players.
Lemma 4.7 For all i 2 N,
P
Γ2Ci LΓ
i = (n ¡ 2)!Mi
P
j2Nnfig Mj.
Proof: In a similar way as in Proposition 4.5, we can show that jCi \ C(j)j =
jCi \ C(k)j for all j;k 2 Nnfig. Analogous to Proposition 4.6, we then have
P
¾2Π(N):¾(1)=i w(¾) = (n ¡ 2)!
P
j2Nnfig Mj. Since player i always gets Mi at the
ﬁrst position, the statement follows. ¤
Step 5: numerator, other players




for all i 2 N;i 6= k. First, in a similar way as in Lemma 4.2, one can compute the
total weighted larginal for each chain, as is done in the next lemma.





> > > <
> > > :
w(Γ)Mj if s < p¾1;
(v(N) ¡
Pp¾1¡1





k=s+1 M¾1(k))Mj if Γ 2 ¯ P(j);
0 if s > p¾1 + q ¡ 1:
Example 4.4 Of course, LΓ
1 = w(Γ)M1 = 11¢5 = 55 and LΓ




2 = w(¾1)(v(N) ¡ M1) + w(¾2)(v(N) ¡ M1 ¡ M3)
+w(¾3)(v(N) ¡ M1 ¡ M3 ¡ M4)
= 3 ¢ (10 ¡ 5) + 4 ¢ (10 ¡ 5 ¡ 1) + 4 ¢ (10 ¡ 5 ¡ 1 ¡ 3)
= 35:
Indeed, this equals (v(N)¡
Pp¾1¡1
k=1 M¾1(k))M2 = (10¡5)¢2, as stated in Lemma 4.8.
For player 3, which belongs to Γ but is not the pivot, we have
L
Γ
3 = w(¾1) ¢ 0 + w(¾2)M3 + w(¾3)M3
= 0 + 4 ¢ 1 + 4 ¢ 1
= 8;
which equals the expression in Lemma 4.8. For player 4, the computation is similar.
/
Lemma 4.9 For all i;k 2 N;i 6= k, we have
P
Γ2Ck LΓ
i = (n ¡ 2)!(v(N) ¡ Mk)Mi.
Proof: We prove the assertion using an iterative procedure, varying the utopia
payoﬀs while keeping v(N) constant. We denote the utopia vector in iteration t
by Mt and throughout the procedure, this vector satisﬁes all our assumptions. We
ﬁrst show that the statement holds for M1 = (v(N);:::;v(N)) ¸ M. Then we
iteratively reduce the components of the utopia vector one by one until we, after
ﬁnitely many steps, end up in M. For every Mt, we show that for the corresponding
(induced) set of chains, the total weighted payoﬀ to i is as stated, as function of the
utopia vector.
Step 1
Take M1 = (v(N);:::;v(N)). Then all chains consist of one permutation, in which
the second player is the pivot. Player i gets 0 if he is after the pivot and v(N)¡M1
k









Suppose that the statement holds for utopia vector Mt¡1. If Mt¡1 = M, then we
18are ﬁnished. Otherwise, there exists a j 2 N such that M
t¡1
j > Mj. We now reduce
j’s utopia payoﬀ until one of the chains changes, or until Mj is reached.
A chain changes if in one of its permutations, the pivot changes. Obviously, this can
only happen if player j is before the pivot. Because in the ﬁrst permutation of each
chain the gap between what the pivot gets and his utopia payoﬀ is smallest, this










the ﬁrst chain changes when j’s utopia payoﬀ is decreased by
° = minf°(¾1)jf¾1;:::;¾qg 2 Ck;¾
¡1
1 (j) · p¾1g: (4.3)
Assume for the moment that the corresponding argmin is unique and denote its ﬁrst
permutation by ˆ ¾.
If ° ¸ M
t¡1
j ¡ Mj, then decreasing j’s utopia payoﬀ from M
t¡1
j to Mj does not






h for all h 2 Nnfjg. Proceed to step t + 1.
Otherwise, deﬁne the second-highest gap ˜ ° by
˜ ° = minf°(¾1)jf¾1;:::;¾qg 2 Ck;¾
¡1








h 2 Nnfjg. We show that the statement holds for this new utopia vector.
As mentioned before, ˆ ¾ is the ﬁrst in a chain, say Γ 2 Ck. So, ˆ ¾ must be either of
type ¡P¡ or ¡PP. Deﬁne s = ˆ ¾¡1(i) and distinguish between the two cases:
² ˆ ¾ is of type ¡P¡:
ˆ ¾R belongs to another chain, say ∆ 2 Ck with length q. Note that the players
ˆ ¾(pˆ ¾¡q+1);:::; ˆ ¾(pˆ ¾¡1) and ˆ ¾(pˆ ¾+1) belong to ∆. When the pivot changes
in ˆ ¾, this permutation joins ∆, as type PP¡, forming chain ∆ [ fˆ ¾g. Hence,
chain Γ disappears and the length of ∆ is increased by one, while the other





of Mt¡1 equals L
∆[fˆ ¾g;t
i as function of Mt. Using Lemma 4.8, we have:





























i (i is before ∆ [ fˆ ¾g):
– s = pˆ ¾:
L
Γ;t¡1







i (Γ 2 P(i));
L
∆;t¡1
i = 0 (i is after ∆);
L
∆[fˆ ¾g;t







i (i is last in ∆ [ fˆ ¾g):







i (i is before Γ);
L
∆;t¡1












i (∆ 2 ¯ P(i));
L
∆[fˆ ¾g;t












i (∆ [ fˆ ¾g 2 ¯ P(i)):
– s = pˆ ¾ + 1:
L
Γ;t¡1
i = 0 (i is after Γ);
L
∆;t¡1







i ; (∆ 2 P(i));
L
∆[fˆ ¾g;t







i (∆ [ fˆ ¾g 2 P(i)):







i = 0 (i is after all three chains):




i as function of Mt¡1 equals
L
∆[fˆ ¾g;t
i as function of Mt.
² ˆ ¾ is ¡PP:
ˆ ¾R belongs to the same chain as ˆ ¾. When the pivot changes in ˆ ¾, this per-
mutation will form a new chain of length one. In the same manner as in the
previous case, we can show that the total weighted payoﬀ to i as function of
the utopia vector in these two chains remains the same.
So, from these two cases, we conclude that the statement holds for the new set of
chains induced by the (lower) utopia vector Mt. Proceed to step t + 1.
We assumed that the minimal gap in (4.3) is obtained for a unique permutation,
ˆ ¾. Suppose now that there exists another permutation, ˜ ¾, with this minimal gap.
Since both ˆ ¾ and ˜ ¾ are of type ¡P¡ or ¡PP, they must belong to diﬀerent chains
Γ and ˜ Γ. Also the two corresponding “neighbouring” chains ∆ and ˜ ∆ are diﬀerent,
and diﬀerent from Γ and ˜ Γ. Hence, we can consider the analysis in step t for ˆ ¾ and
˜ ¾ separately to prove the statement.
Finally, our procedure stops after ﬁnitely many steps, because in all the changes,
the pivot concerned moves towards the back of a permutation. ¤
Step 6: ﬁnal
In this ﬁnal step, we combine our previous results to prove the main theorem.































= (n ¡ 1)!v(N)Mi:
















Hence, ¿¤ = ³. ¤
As stated in section 2, for the class of compromise admissible games in which,
after normalising such that the minimal rights vector equals zero, each player’s
utopia payoﬀ is at most the value of the grand coalition, the ¿¤ value coincides with
the compromise value. As a result, Theorem 3.1 gives a geometric characterisation
of the latter on this class of games.
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